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describe such a world as one with perfect and
complete markets.
If we lived in a world of complete markets,
would there be any need for government interven-
tion into financial markets? Government interven-
tion into credit markets would probably not be an
efficient way for society to deal with problems of
income distribution and externalities. Thus, I
think the correct starting point for analysis is a
presumption that there is no justification for gov-
ernment intervention in private financial markets. 
Justification for intervention requires two
steps. First, that market failures can be corrected
by intervention and, second, that actual function-
ing of government, in the real world and not in
an ideal world, makes such correction possible
and productive for society. 
Perhaps the appropriate starting point for
analysis of market failure in this context is that
information is a valuable and sometimes scarce
and costly good to obtain. Moreover, because debt
contracts cannot be enforced to the point of slav-
ery, credit markets do not and cannot allow a
household complete flexibility in consuming its
lifetime wealth—nor do insurance markets allow
protection against all conceivable risks. Indeed,
in our own nation’s distant past, private markets
for credit and insurance must be described as
primitive. In some parts of the world, the same is
true today.
Economists have created an enormous litera-
ture exploring the imperfections and incomplete-
ness of actual financial markets during the 50-plus
years since Kenneth Arrow (Arrow and Debreu,
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I’ll frame the policy debate from an econo-
mist’s perspective. Imagine a world in which every
household could borrow and lend as much as it
wanted within its lifetime budget constraint.
Within that budget constraint, the timing of con-
sumption could be divorced from the timing of
income receipts. In this idealized world of com-
plete financial markets, households and businesses
can utilize their lifetime financial resources and
manage their financial risks in the most advanta-
geous way possible via private trading. Interest
rates determined by the free exchange of claims on
purchasing power over time would regulate the
credit market. Suppose also that every household
could insure itself financially, or sell insurance
if it chose, against all possible future misfortunes.
The insurance market would clear when all con-
tracts were voluntarily settled at what economists
call actuarially fair prices.
Moreover, suppose that all the information
needed to make good decisions were available
without cost. In this economy, every household’s
economic welfare would be as great as possible,
given the economy’s finite resources. Economists
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      1954), one of our distinguished panelists, and a
few others first wrote down mathematical models
of an idealized economy of complete markets. The
roster of market failures enumerated by Joseph
Stiglitz (1988), another of our distinguished
panelists, includes (i) failures of competition,
(ii) public goods, (iii) externalities, (iv) incomplete
markets, (v) information failures, and (vi) macro-
economic failures, sometimes also termed coordi-
nation failures. 
We recognize that a market failure is a neces-
sary, but not a sufficient, condition for improving
welfare through government intervention. Market
failure is not a sufficient condition because govern-
ments also fail, and they do so for systematic
reasons explored in the public-choice literature.
Professor Stiglitz lists four principal reasons for
government failure when attempting to correct a
market failure: (i) limited information, (ii) limited
control over market responses, (iii) limited control
over bureaucracy, and (iv) limitations imposed
by political processes.
The first two reasons for government failure
remind us that some market failures simply are
intractable—that is, the same limitations that
cause markets to perform poorly, such as insuffi-
cient information available to participants, may
prevent government intervention from improving
matters. The second two reasons for government
failure—limits on effectiveness posed by bureau-
cracy and the political process—are handicaps
government itself brings to the situation. More-
over, it is important to recognize that some govern-
ment failures may be inherent in the nature of
democracy.
Thus, we must keep in mind that identifying
a market failure is not enough to justify a govern-
ment intervention. We must also satisfy our-
selves that any government failures that might
result from the proposed intervention do not do
greater harm than good.
Today, government interventions are extensive
in private markets for credit and insurance in the
United States and around the world. The record
of government intervention in these markets is
mixed. Part of the problem may be that interven-
tions once appropriate are not phased out as con-
ditions change. Thus, every government credit
program deserves frequent evaluation and re-
evaluation, and such an evaluation is the agenda
of this conference.  
The subject is a huge one, and not every
issue can be examined in a single conference.
Our sessions cover a range of federal programs
in U.S. credit and insurance markets. These pro-
grams include social insurance of various kinds,
including loan guarantees; extensive intervention
into housing and mortgage markets; deposit and
defined-benefit pension insurance; and insurance
against disasters, both natural and man-made,
such as terrorism. Our aim is to discuss the
market failures these programs are designed to
overcome and the performance of government
interventions. 
We have assembled a program of scholars
and policy analysts of the highest rank who may
disagree with each other in analyzing a particular
program but who share a common interest in
examining the rationale for, and execution of, a
variety of federal credit and insurance programs.
I know that our presenters and discussants will
shed new light on some very important programs.
I believe that we will provide assistance to policy-
makers who are responsible for these programs. 
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